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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
31.141 The revisers considered such a specification unnecessary
since, if consent is required, it may be proved when the motion
is made or in the special proceeding. 42
The instant case, although not substantially altering established
practice, presents a good illustration of the operation of the
CPLR in this area.
ARTICLE 30- REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3011: Counterclaim not permitted in plaintiff's reply.
Under Section 272 of the Civil Practice Act, a plaintiff's reply
to a counterclaim was generally limited to denials or defenses. 4 3
Thus, the plaintiff could not, in his reply, interpose an affirmative
cause of action against the defendant. The First Report of the
Advisory Committee declared that "there is no provision for the
assertion of a crossclaim or counterclaim by a plaintiff in a reply." 14
CPLR 3011 provides that "there shall be a reply to a counterclaim."
Whether or not a counterclaim could be contained in a reply under
CPLR 3011, however, was not judicially resolved until Habiby
v. Habiby."'4
In Habiby, the defendant moved to strike certain items from
the plaintiff's reply, one of which was, in effect, a counterclaim.
Granting the defendant's motion, the appellate division held that
CPLR 3011 does not call for a departure from the old rule which
prohibited the pleading of a counterclaim in a reply.
In spite of the fact that the court seems to have discretionary
power to allow the assertion of a counterclaim in a reply, 46 if
the plaintiff wants to assert a new cause of action against the de-
fendant the proper procedure is to move to amend his original
complaint under CPLR 3025(b). He thus has an ample pro-
cedural tool to assert additional claims; he does not need the
reply as a means of asserting them.
'41 Rule 31 required an acknowledgment of a consent to the payment and
proof of identity of the applicant by some other person. See 2 WEINSTEIN,
KORN & M.LER, Nav YORK CIVIL PRAcnrcn ff2606.04 (1964).
342 TEam REP. 418.
143 E.g., Seligmann v. Mandel, 19 Misc. 2d 418, 190 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup.
Ct. 1959) ; Phillips v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 175 Misc. 1009, 26 N.Y.S.2d
58 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 261 App. Div. 946, 27 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1st Dep't
1941).
144 FRST REP. 71.
'45 23 App. Div. 2d 558, 256 N.Y.S.2d 634 (1st Dep't 1965).
146 Cf. CPLR 3011. "There shall be no other pleading unless the court
orders otherwise." Ibid.
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